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The Dynamics and Global Implications of
Subglobal Carbon-Restricting Regimes
JUSCELINO F. COLARES*
The European Union and Australia have enacted comprehensive carbon-
restricting reforms that will affect both domestic and foreign industries. After
describing these reforms in detail, the article develops a microeconomic ana-
lytical model that explains the impact these regimes have on the dynamics of
inter-firm competition in carbon-restricting nations and how they will also
influence technology choices by certain industries in carbon-friendly nations.
Specifically, exporters and producers operating in vertically-integrated indus-
tries in carbon-friendly nations will increasingly elect carbon-efficient technolo-
gies to minimize costs as they adjust to a changing international regulatory
environment. The article hypothesizes that this shift in the carbon intensity of
production will cause these industries to form coalitions with other pro-
environment groups to pressure national governments for legislative and global
carbon-restricting reforms that reduce carbon leakage and losses from trading
with industries in carbon-laggard nations. Because these cumulative develop-
ments will eventually lead to a binding global emissions-stabilizing agreement,
pursuant to which border measures will be taken, the article offers a few
suggestions for reducing potential conflicts between the trade and climate change
regimes.
INTRODUCTION‡
When considering technological options in a world where restricting emis-
sions is increasingly the policy response to climate change, firms must choose
between lower present-cost/lower future-benefit carbon-friendly production and
higher present-cost/higher future-benefit carbon-efficient production. This article
argues that firms will increasingly favor the latter over time, whether they are
based in carbon-restricting nations or whether they intend to continue selling
goods and services in those markets. That is the case because one of the effects of
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44106; email: colares@case.edu. © 2013, Juscelino F. Colares.
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carbon-restricting policies is the creation of a market price for carbon, which
turns carbon into a factor of production,1 thus affecting firms’ cost-minimization
strategies. This article explains in detail the economic dynamics2 that support this
technological switch both at the firm and inter-firm levels in carbon-restricting
countries and how this trend to carbon efficiency will extend to producers in
carbon-friendly nations.
The mere possibility that carbon-restricting governments might resort to
adopting level-the-playing field measures, such as border carbon adjustments
(“BCAs”),3 increases regulatory uncertainty for carbon-friendly producers and,
thus, steers their decisions toward more carbon-efficient production. Gradually,
the economic interests of exporters of goods and services to these markets
become more closely aligned with climate-friendly action, increasing the level of
support for adopting carbon-restricting policies in former carbon-friendly coun-
tries. National legislatures may respond to these developments by enacting
statutes providing for domestic carbon-restricting regimes that further reinforce
the trend toward carbon efficient production. Pursuit of such legislation by
industries exposed to foreign carbon-restrictions will be driven by either level-the-
playing field or purely rent-seeking rationales, as such stakeholders will want to
subject their competitors in climate-friendly nations to the same rules.4 The
successive adoption of climate-friendly legislation at the subglobal level by
different nations will eventually increase the pace of negotiations for a multilat-
eral GHG stabilization agreement.5
1. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960) (“If factors of production
are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to understand that the right to do something which has a harmful
effect . . . is also a factor of production.”).
2. This dynamic, which involves explaining how firms engage in cost minimization by choosing among
different factors of production, has been neatly formalized in microeconomics. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDI-
ATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 339 (4th ed. 1996). I use this approach in Part III.
3. A BCA is a tariff designed to offset the cost disadvantage producers of goods and services operating in
climate-leading countries face when in competition with more carbon-intensive imports from climate-laggard
countries, thus reducing the potential leakage of CO2 emissions to the latter. See Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon Tariffs
and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 749, 751-52 (2009). In practice, a BCA
could be enforced by either requiring importers to purchase emission allowances from an existing emissions
trading scheme (i.e., where the importing country has implemented a cap-and-trade system), or by subjecting an
import to a levy based on a preset measure of its emissions footprint (i.e., where the importing country has
imposed similar carbon taxes on domestic goods). See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADE REPORT
2012 83 (2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf.
4. Briefly stated, rent-seeking refers to economic actors’ pursuit of narrow, concentrated, unearned benefits
or collective goods (i.e., rents), provided by governments through legislation or other public means, that
imposes socially-spread distributed costs. See generally Robert Tollison, Rent-Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS
575, 577 (1982) (defining rent-seeking as the “activity of wasting resources in competing for artificially
contrived transfers”).
5. I borrow the term “subglobal” from Daniel Farber’s article, Carbon Leakage Versus Policy Diffusion:
The Perils and Promise of Subglobal Climate Action, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 359-62 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2102060. While Farber explains why subglobal mitigating
efforts can become important steps toward a global agreement, I focus on explaining how the economic and
legal dynamics of subglobal mitigating efforts are likely to influence global cooperation in the coming years.
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Whereas the role BCAs will play in this process remains uncertain, their
adoption is not strictly essential to the spread of carbon-restricting regimes to
other countries. Arguably, adoption of a WTO-compliant BCA6 by either the
E.U., Australia, or any other early reformer would accelerate the pace of
carbon-restriction reform and expand the reach of these policies worldwide.
Indeed, it is not surprising that the United States’ failed attempt to pass such a
statute provided for this type of border measure,7 clearly anticipating the obvious
trade and carbon leakage effects8 the new regime would have on U.S. industry.9
That the currently operating E.U. and Australian regimes have not yet established
a BCA may partially explain the slower pace of reform elsewhere (so far, at
least). However, this says nothing about the likelihood of future BCA adoption in
a binding multilateral carbon-restricting agreement where BCAs will be favored
due to the need to avoid carbon leakage and non-neutral trade measures. Fur-
thermore, when temporary alleviating measures (e.g., grants, free allowances, tax
rebates) expire, and carbon prices stabilize at higher levels, the likelihood of
BCAs will only increase.
This article explains the major features of the current carbon emission regimes
in the E.U. (Part I) and Australia (Part II). With the aid of microeconomics, it
explains the impact these regimes have on the dynamics of inter-firm competition
6. In principle, a BCA or any other trade-impacting measure that discriminates among products from
different foreign nations or among products from foreign and domestic sources solely on the basis of
carbon-efficiency would be deemed neutral. Such a measure would be deemed WTO-compliant if it came
within the scope of one of the exceptions of and satisfied the requirements set forth in the chapeau of Article XX
of GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT] art. XX(b) & (g). A number of commentators have argued this point persuasively, although
with some qualifications. See Christopher Tran, Using GATT, Art XX to Justify Climate Change Measures in
Claims Under the WTO Agreements, 27 ENVTL. & PLAN. L. J. 346, 349-53 (2010); Veel, supra note 3, at 777-78;
Francesco Sindico, The EU and Carbon Leakage: How to Reconcile Border Adjustments with the WTO?
17 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. R. 328, 338-39 (2008); Zhong Xiang Zhang, Domestic Climate Policies and the
WTO, 27 WORLD ECON. 359, 379-81 (2004).
7. See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 11th Cong. §§ 766-67 (2009) [hereinafter
“Waxman-Markey”].
8. Carbon leakage can fully or partially negate a country’s efforts in reducing emissions in two ways:
(i) higher emission costs may shift production of carbon-intensive goods and services to carbon-friendly
nations, where such costs are not imposed; and (ii) the reduction in fossil fuel use in carbon-restricting nations
may lower global energy prices, thereby inducing more energy consumption in carbon-friendly nations. See,
e.g., Niven Winchester et al., Will Border Carbon Adjustments Work?, 11 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y art. 7,
at 1 (2011) (describing carbon leakage); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN
REVIEW 551 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6th prtg. 2009) (explaining how carbon leakage creates
competitiveness concerns).
9. See, e.g., Zack Hale, Democrats Try to Walk Fine Line on Tariffs, NAT’L J. (July 9, 2009), http://
www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/no_20090708_2274.php (referring to Democratic Senators’ competitive-
ness concerns and citing Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown’s comment that “I don’t think you can fully take care
of manufacturing without some border equalization.”); John Kerry & Lindsey Graham, Yes We Can (Pass
Climate Change Legislation), NY TIMES (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/opinion/11kerry
graham.html?pagewantedall (demonstrating that at least one Republican Senator was concerned with not
“surrender[ing] our marketplace to countries that do not accept environmental standards,” and who favored
adopting “a border tax on items produced in countries that avoid these standards.”).
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in carbon-restricting nations and how these developments will also influence
technology choices by exporting industries in carbon-friendly nations (Part III).
At this point, the article hypothesizes that, as these industries shift to more
carbon-efficient technologies and production methods, they are likely to form
coalitions with other pro-environment groups to pressure national govern-
ments for legislative and global carbon-restricting reforms that reduce carbon
leakage and losses from trading with industries in carbon-laggard nations.
Because these cumulative developments eventually lead to a binding global
emissions-stabilizing agreement, pursuant to which border measures will be
taken, the article offers a few suggestions for reducing potential conflicts between
the trade and the climate change regimes (Part IV).
I. THE E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME
A. DESCRIBING QUALIFYING EMITTERS AND THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PLANS
The E.U. set up ETS, its cap-and-trade system, with Directive 2003/87/EC.10
This directive requires that all operators of installations that emit GHGs within
the E.U. obtain permits from their respective member states.11 Although six
different types of GHGs come within its scope,12 the Founding Directive is
limited to regulating installations that emit CO2.13 The E.U. Commission has
reserved the right to include new installations, if monitoring and reporting
of the emissions “can be carried out with sufficient accuracy.”14 All EU-based,
CO2-emitting operators must submit an application for a permit.15 To obtain
the permit, they must be capable of monitoring and reporting emissions and
agree to surrender allowances equal to the total amount of emissions for a given
year.16
The Founding Directive set up different time periods, assigning to each a
different objective. The first period went from January 1, 2005, through Decem-
ber 31, 2007; the second from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2012; and
the third began on January 1, 2013.17 Member states retained the authority to
develop national plans for the total number of allowances issued in each time
period, but this authority is subject to several E.U. criteria.18 The number one
10. See Council Directive 2003/87/EC [hereinafter the “Founding Directive”], 2003 O.J. (L275) 32-46 (EC).
11. Id., art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L275) 35.
12. Id., annex II, 2003 O.J. (L275) 43.
13. Id., annex I, 2003 O.J. (L275) 42.
14. Id., art. 24(3), 2003 O.J. (L275) 39.
15. See id., art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L275) 35.
16. Id., art. 6, 2003 O.J. (L275) 35.
17. See id., art. 11, 2003 O.J. (L275) 36.
18. Id., art. 9, 2003 O.J. (L275) 35-36. The Founding Directive lists 11 different criteria for national plans.
Id., annex III, 2003 O.J. (L275) 43.
420 THE GEORGETOWN INT’L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:417
criterion is to meet the member states’ obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.19
Although the member states create the national plans, the E.U. Commission
retains the ultimate authority to reject the plan if it is not compatible with the
Founding Directive’s criteria.20 As such, the total cap for the ETS is the sum of all
member states’ national plans.
Each member state must punish operators who do not comply with the national
plan.21 These penalties must be “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.”22 In
addition to member states’ penalties, member states must apply a fee on any
excess emissions.23 They must charge €100 for each metric tonne (i.e., 1,000 kg)
of CO2 in excess of an allowance.24 However, during the first period, member
states were authorized to charge €40.25
B. ALLOWANCE DISTRIBUTION BY MEMBER STATES
Just as member states retained the authority to create their own national plans,
under the Founding Directive they also reserved the power to distribute allow-
ances pursuant to their own plans. For the first period (2005-07), the member
states had to issue at least 95% of the allowances for free, leaving a maximum of
5% for auctions.26 For the second period (2008-12), the directive allowed
member states to auction up to 10% of all allowances (i.e., at least 90% of
allowances must be distributed free of charge).27 Thus, a member state could
theoretically issue 100% free allowances, so long as doing so would be consistent
with its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.28
In the first period (2005-07), four member states auctioned allowances; in the
second (2008-12), eight member states did so.29 Overall, only 0.13% of all
allowances were auctioned in the first period.30 This percentage rose to 3% in the
second period.31 Ellerman et al. explain that the limited auctioning by members
operates both as a way to facilitate “political acceptance of the new system” and
as a form of compensation to those entities “that had made prior investments
when no CO2 price existed and that might be disadvantaged by the new
19. Id.
20. Id., art. 9(3), 2003 O.J. (L275) 36.
21. Id., art. 16, 2003 O.J. (L275) 37.
22. Id., art. 16(1), 2003 O.J. (L275) 37.
23. Id., art. 16(3), 2003 O.J. (L275) 37.
24. Id.
25. Id., art. 16(4), 2003 O.J. (L275) 37.
26. Id., art. 10, 2003 O.J. (L275) 36.
27. See id.
28. See id., annex III, 2003 O.J. (L275) 43.
29. A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., PRICING CARBON: THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 62
(2010).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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system,”32 which, without free allowances, would charge them for emissions
from a lower baseline.
C. AUCTIONING AND FREE ALLOWANCES GOING FORWARD
Allowance distribution under the ETS will undergo substantial changes in
2013. Directive 2009/29/EC, which amended the Founding Directive, requires
member states to auction a substantially higher percentage of their national
allowances.33 According to the E.U. Commission, “about half of the allowances
are expected to be auctioned.”34 With member states and industries accustomed
to measuring, reporting, and either receiving or paying for allowances since
2005, ETS is on a path to establish a more robust carbon price starting in 2013. Its
major limitation remains the current crisis in the Eurozone and its macroeco-
nomic effects, which have depressed carbon prices due to lower general levels of
economic activity and emissions in the region.35
Crisis aside, only a few important exceptions will allow deviations from the
prescribed, increasing trend toward emission auctioning.36 The first exception
covers the energy sectors of mostly former soviet bloc countries; nations that
share a “connection to the European grid, per capita GDP, and dependence on
single fuel.”37 In these countries, third-period free allowances cannot exceed
70% of the annual average verified emissions in 2005-2007 from the energy
sector.38 After 2013, the free allocations must continually decrease until total
elimination by 2020, where they are expected to finally converge with other E.U.
members.39
The second exception to ordinary emission auctioning requirements covers
sectors exposed to a “significant risk” of carbon leakage, i.e., sectors particularly
exposed to losses due to direct competition with similar sectors in non-carbon-
restricting nations.40 Companies in these at-risk sectors may receive up to 100%
free allowances based on benchmarks set by “the average performance of the
32. Id., at 63.
33. See Council Directive 2009/29/EC [hereinafter the “Amending Directive”], art. 10, 2009 O.J. (L140) 63,
71 (EC).
34. Emissions Trading System: Auctioning, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 10, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets/auctioning/index_en.htm.
35. See Stephen Gardner, E.U. Data Shows Decline in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Covered by Cap-and-
Trade System, BLOOMBERG BNA WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REP., Apr. 3, 2012, available at http://news.bna.
com/clln/CLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid25773129&vnameccrnotallissues&fcn2&wsn502270000
&fn25773129&split0 (explaining that “the lower [member-state] emissions led to a fall in the price of ETS
allowances to about €6.50 ($8.65), with prices at one stage dropping to a record low of €6.14 ($8.20)”).
36. Amending Directive, art. 10(1), 2009 O.J. (L140) 71.
37. ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 76 (paraphrasing the Amending Directive, art. 10c 1(a)-(c), 2009 O.J.
(L140) 76).
38. Amending Directive, art. 10c(2), 2009 O.J. (L140) 76.
39. Id., art. 10c(2).
40. See id., art. 10a, 10b, 2009 O.J. (L140) 72-76. For a definition of carbon leakage, see note 8.
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10% most efficient installations” from 2007-2008 in the same sector.41 To qual-
ify, a sector must show that:
(1) the direct CO2 costs and indirect CO2 costs from the pass-through of
CO2 costs in power prices are more than 30% of gross value added (GVA); or
(2) that the non-E.U. trade intensity (exports plus imports as a share of
production plus imports) is greater than 30%; or (3) the cost to GVA criteria
is ten per cent or larger and the non-E.U. trade intensity is greater than ten
per cent and other qualitative criteria (investments, market structures, profit
margins) indicate exposure to a significant risk of carbon leakage.42
The push for carbon efficiency is clear: After measuring emissions and dis-
tributing, initially, free allowances, the E.U. cap-and-trade system transitions
into auctioning allowances, with criteria-based exceptions playing a mitigating
role.
D. CARBON LEAKAGE AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
In addition to free allowances, member states may adopt “financial measures”
to support emitters that are at significant risk of carbon leakage.43 These financial
measures are expressly designed to offset the greater energy “costs relating to
greenhouse gas emissions passed on in electricity prices,” resulting from the
E.U.’s carbon-restricting regime.44 Although opaque at this point, the as-applied
industry-specificity of such financial assistance may run afoul of the anti-subsidy
provisions in the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.45
Regardless, the European carbon regime described so far, though prepared to
mitigate the competitive effects of its carbon restrictions, does not contain a
broad BCA, unlike Waxman-Markey (e.g., §§ 766-767).46
While proposing to offset the eventual initial competitive disadvantages
of carbon-efficient production with free allowances and bestowal of financial
assistance on the most affected industries, the E.U. directives generally stop short
of imposing level-the-playing-field extraterritorial measures. The only extraterri-
41. Amending Directive, art. 10a(2), 2009 O.J. (L140) 73.
42. ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 77 n. 14 (paraphrasing the Amending Directive, art. 10a 15-16, 2009
O.J. (L140) 75).
43. Amending Directive, art. 10a (6), 2009 O.J. (L140) 73; see also Carbon Leakage: Possibility of
Financial Compensation for Indirect Emissions, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 25, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets/leakage/index_en.htm (“Article 10a6 . . . provides for the possibility for Member States to compensate the
most electro-intensive sectors for increases in electricity costs resulting from the ETS through national state aid
schemes. Therefore, the Commission will correspondingly modify the Environmental State Aid Guidelines. The
adoption of the new rules is foreseen for 2011.”).
44. Amending Directive, art. 10a (6), 2009 O.J. (L140) 73.
45. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter the “SCM Agreement” or “SCM”], art. 2, Legal In-
struments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14.
46. See Waxman-Markey supra note 7.
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torial foray under the current rules is the inclusion of foreign-based airlines in the
ETS, which, once in operation, will be the E.U.’s first de facto BCA.
E. THE ADDITION OF AVIATION
The E.U. included the aviation sector in the ETS in 2008;47 yet, actual
allocation of allowances for airlines did not begin until January 1, 2012, a year
prior to the start of ETS’s third period.48 Like the ETS Founding Directive it
amends, the Aviation Directive describes covered activities (i.e., qualifying
flights), but goes further by providing an industry-specific (i) emissions cap;
(ii) 15% allowance-auctioning requirement; and (iii) residual free allowances.
Qualifying flights are flights that “arrive at or depart from an aerodrome situated
in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies.”49
The inclusion of non-E.U. based airlines has raised the concerns of U.S.
airlines, which have attempted to challenge what they perceive as impermissible
extra-territorial regulatory jurisdiction. In Air Transport Ass’n of America. v.
Secretary of State for Energy & Climate Change,50 they challenged such action
on three grounds: (i) violation of international law by reaching intercontinental
flights; (ii) failure to negotiate a multi-lateral treaty under the auspices of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”)51; and (iii) creation of a tax
in violation of international commitments (e.g., Chicago Convention on Civil
Aviation52 and the “Open Skies” Agreement53). The European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”) rejected these claims on two grounds: (i) the E.U. is not a party to the
Chicago Convention and is, therefore, not bound by its restrictions; and (ii) the
Open Skies agreement does not proscribe compliance with ordinary regulatory
measures that do not amount to a tax, which is how the ECJ characterized the
sector’s inclusion into the ETS.54 Airlines for America, an industry lobby, claims
47. See Council Directive 2008/101/EC [hereinafter the “Aviation Directive”], 2009 O.J. (L8) 3-21 (EC).
48. See id., art. 3c, 2009 O.J. (L8) 8.
49. Id., annex, 2009 O.J. (L8) 17. The directive excludes different types of flights based on specific purposes,
including, inter alia, flights by official members of non-member-state governments and military and other
rescue service flights. Id.
50. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Sec’y St. Energy & Climate Change, ¶ 42, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uriCELEX:62010CC0366:EN:HTML (Advocate General’s Opinion),
(Oct. 6, 2011).
51. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 44, Dec. 7, 1947, 61 Stat. 1180, 1192, 15 U.N.T.S.
295 [hereinafter the “Chicago Convention”] (establishing the ICAO whose goals include fostering the
development of international air transport), available at http://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx.
52. See id., art. 24, 61 Stat. 1180, 1186, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
53. The official name of the EU-US “Open Skies” agreement is the Air Transport Agreement, which exempts
“aircraft operated in international air transportation” between the parties from “taxes, levies, duties, fees and
charges . . . with the exception of charges based on the cost of the service provided.” Air Transport Agreement,
art. 11, Apr. 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470, 478-479, 2007 O.J. (L134) 4, 11 (EC), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/114872.pdf.
54. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Sec’y St. Energy & Climate Change, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex
LEXIS 3289 at * 1-2 (Dec. 21, 2011).
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that its members will have to pay more than $3.1 billion to the EU.55
As of this writing, the official position of the E.U. is that the system is in
full force despite current controversy over the desirability of multi-lateral agree-
ment.56 Chinese and Indian airlines, however, have yet to comply with the
Directive’s requirement to report emissions in flights to and from Europe, an
indication that legal battles loom ahead.57 United States officials have exhorted
the E.U. to pursue these matters through ICAO,58 which does have the authority
to impose obligations on parties engaged in international commercial aviation,
but has so far failed to impose any emission reduction requirements.59 This
failure within ICAO makes E.U. action more, not less likely, however. Domesti-
cally, the E.U. has authority to proceed (and it has indicated it will) and it is
probably prepared to meet any future WTO challenge to its aviation measures
with a defense on environmental grounds under GATT, Article XX. In such a
defense, the E.U. will argue that measures including the aviation sector in ETS
come within the scope of GATT as “measures relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources,” made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
industry,60 which were only resorted to after years of multilateral obstruction and
inaction within ICAO and other international fora.61
Controversy apart, the aviation scheme, now in operation, divides the issuing
of allowances for airline operators into two time periods. Under each period,
emissions are capped by reference to historical aviation emissions. The latter are
calculated by using the covered aircraft operators’ “mean average of the annual
55. Nicola Clark, Carbon Emission Fees for Flights Upheld, NY TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/business/global/court-upholds-europes-plan-to-charge-airlines-for-
carbon-emissions.html.
56. Daniel Pruzin & Stephen Gardner, Air Industry Group Leader Cites Hardening Positions in Global
Emissions, BLOOMBERG BNA WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REP., Mar. 20, 2012, available at http://news.bna.com/
clln/CLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid24841999&vnameccrnotallissues&fcn4&wsn502660000&fn
24841999&split0.
57. See Stephen Gardner, Chinese, Indian Airlines Fail to Submit Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data Required
by EU, BLOOMBERG BNA WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REP., May 15, 2012, available at http://news.bna.com/clln/
CLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid26056113&vnameccrnotallissues&fcn1&wsn501272000&fn26056
113&split0.
58. See, e.g., The European Union’s Emissions Trading System before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., (June 6, 2012) (statement of Ray LaHood, U.S. Sec’y of Transp.), available at http://commerce.
senate.gov/public/?aFiles.Serve&File_id9f35bb3b-c8bd-4ee0-87aa-57819b7b914f.
59. ICAO has so far succeeded in establishing important, though mostly aspirational, fuel efficiency targets
for the aviation industry. See ICAO, Declaration by the High-level Meeting on International Aviation and
Climate Change, Summary of Discussions, at A-2, HLM-ENV/09-SD/2, ¶ 2 (Oct. 19, 2009).
60. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(g).
61. Unfortunately, the prospects for such a case to arise have increased recently. “High-level” officials
meeting under the auspices of ICAO have failed to reach any consensus on how to forge a global agree-
ment to limiting GHG emissions from the aviation sector. See Daniel Pruzin, Officials Cite Limited Progress
on Global Deal to Curb Aviation’s Greenhouse Gases, BLOOMBERG BNA WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REP.,
Feb. 6, 2013, available at http://news.bna.com/ieln/IELNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid29623566&vname
inernotallissues&wsn500112000&searchid19490483&doctypeid1&typedate&modedoc&split0&scm
IELNWB&pg0.
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emissions in the calendar years 2004, 2005, and 2006.”62 Each airline’s emissions
are calculated by multiplying fuel consumption times an emission factor.63
Emissions for the first aviation-specific period (January 1, 2012-December 31,
2012) are capped at 97% of historical aviation emissions (i.e., a cap that restricts
emissions by 3%).64 During this initial one-year period, members must auction
15% of the allowances.65 Thus, the other 85% will be allocated free of charge.
The second period—beginning on January 1, 2013, and ending on December 31,
201766—will further reduce emissions: Total allowances shall be 95% of the
historical emissions for each five-year period.67 Again, as in the first aviation-
specific period, 15% of the allowances will be auctioned, with the remaining
balance to be allocated free of charge and the difference being that allowances
will be allocated from a lower cap.68
The E.U. Commission has reserved the right to amend the aviation caps for
subsequent periods,69 thereby leaving room for future economic, legal, and
political contingencies. In fact, a contingency emerged even before the start
of the second period (i.e., the period starting on January 1, 2013): E.U. officials
suspended plans to include flights into and out of the E.U. in the ETS “to allow
time to reach a global solution through ICAO,” with the proviso that the
suspension would be revoked should an appropriate international consensus not
be achieved through ICAO in 2013.70 President Obama’s recent signing of
legislation forbidding U.S. airlines from complying with the E.U. aviation
measures71 undoubtedly influenced the recent failure of ICAO-sponsored nego-
tiations and increased the chances of trade litigation under the WTO in the near
future.72
More recently, the E.U. Commission also expressed interest in setting up a
similar scheme for the maritime shipping industry.73 It explained that “while
energy efficiency requirements for certain categories of new ships have been set
62. Aviation Directive, art. 1(3)(b)(s), 2009 O.J. (L8) 8.
63. Id., annex, 2009 O.J. (L8) 18.
64. Id., art. 3c, 2009 O.J. (L8) 8.
65. Id., art. 3d(1), 2009 O.J. (L8) 8.
66. See Founding Directive, art. 11(2), 2003 O.J. (L275) 36.
67. See Aviation Directive, art. 3c(2), 2009 O.J. (L8) 8.
68. See id., art. 3d(2), 2009 O.J. (L8) 8.
69. Id., art. 3c (2), 2009 O.J. (L8) 8.
70. See Pruzin, supra note 61 (reporting E.U. officials as having declared that “airlines automatically will be
included in its cap-and-trade program in 2014 if a suitable international measure is not adopted at the September
(2013) meeting of the ICAO Assembly.”).
71. See European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, S. 1956, § 2(a). The new law
also directs federal officials to pursue international negotiations with the aim of ensuring US airlines are “held
harmless” from the E.U. scheme. Id., § 3(a)(2).
72. See Pruzin, supra note 61.
73. Stephen Gardner, E.U. Consultation Marks Start of Process to Regulate Carbon Emissions from Ship-
ping, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L ENV’T REP., Jan. 20, 2012, available at http://news.bna.com/ieln/IELNWB/split_
display.adp?fedfid24363709&vnameinernotallissues&fcn11&wsn502880000&fn24363709&split0.
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by the [International Maritime Organization] . . . no international regulation
aiming to reduce GHG emissions from existing ships has been adopted.”74 Once
again, the E.U. seems to have responded to the slow progress on multilateral
negotiations by acting unilaterally. Remarkably, this latest move also signals the
EU’s willingness to enlarge the scope of its carbon-restricting extraterritorial
measures. In light of this commitment, defiance by Chinese, Indian, and other
airlines may subside or result in the E.U. imposing surcharges that will result in
trade friction and, probably, litigation. Thus, carbon-related airline fees may
trigger a WTO challenge and an eventual binding response from the WTO on the
use (and limits) of extraterritorial carbon-restricting policies.75 While a WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) pronouncement on an as-applied challenge
would help reduce the uncertainty regarding the role of extraterritorial, trade-
impacting measures, such uncertainty is not keeping the E.U. from implementing
its regulations on the aviation sector. Nor has this uncertainty inhibited other
countries from adopting other carbon-restricting methods, such as the Australian
Carbon Tax.
II. THE AUSTRALIAN CARBON TAX
A. RESTRICTING EMISSIONS IN TWO PHASES
In the summer of 2012, Australia joined the E.U. in restricting GHG emissions,
pursuant to the Clean Energy Act of 2011.76 A major goal of the CEA is “to give
effect to Australia’s obligations under . . . the Kyoto Protocol.”77 The CEA is
divided into two time periods, each having a different method for pricing carbon.
For the first period (July 1, 2012-June 30, 2015), the CEA sets a fixed price for
carbon by means of a “fixed charge”78 or “carbon tax.”79 In the second period, a
cap-and-trade system will replace the tax.80
During the first period, the government will charge a per-tonne tax on facilities
that produce or consume at least 25,000 carbon metric tonnes a year.81 For the
first year (July 1, 2012-June 30, 2013) the price of each carbon tonne will be
74. Id. (quoting from an E.U. document).
75. The WTO Secretariat and the United Nations Environment Program (“UNEP”) have jointly issued a
white paper discussing the WTO-compatibility of different types of carbon-restricting border measures with
WTO rules. See WTO-UNEP REPORT, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Geneva: World Trade Publications 2009),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf. This document, how-
ever, contains the disclaimer that “[a]ny opinions reflected in this publication are the sole responsibility of
the . . . WTO Secretariat,” not the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). See id. at i.
76. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter “CEA”].
77. Id., pt 1, s 3.
78. Id., pt 4, div 2, s 100.
79. Enda Curran & Ray Brindal, Australia’s Carbon Tax Clears Final Hurdle, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2011,
6:40 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204554204577025153789673004.html.
80. See CEA pt 2, s 17.
81. See id., pt 3, div 2, s 22, pt 4, div 2, s 100.
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A$8223.83 The A$23 price per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, around €17,
was also the prevailing price in the E.U. ETS in May 2011.84 However, Ross
Garnaut, the leading Australian climate change economist and author of the
cost-benefit report that spurred parliamentary action, recommended that consider-
ations, such as Australia’s climate change mitigating “commitments, domestic
credibility and other countries’ climate change mitigating policies and their
associated implicit carbon prices” also weigh in setting this price.85 The cost of
each carbon tonne will rise with inflation, that is calculated by selecting the
mid-point of the Reserve Bank of Australia’s inflationary target range or 2.5% per
annum.86 Thus, the tax will be A$24.15 and A$25.40 per tonne in the second
(2013-2014) and third (2014-2015) years, respectively.87
However, the CEA will replace the tax with a cap-and-trade system as the
second period (July 1, 2015) begins.88 The emissions cap in that first year (July 1,
2015-June 30, 2016) will be determined by subtracting thirty-eight million
carbon tonnes from the total emissions during the inaugural year of the carbon tax
(July 1, 2012-June 30, 2013).89 In each subsequent year, the cap will be reduced
by twelve million tonnes.90 Given these constraints, market forces will set the
price for each carbon tonne.91
B. ASSISTING HOUSEHOLDS AND WORKING WITH COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY PRODUCERS
The CEA exempts households from the carbon tax and the cap-and-trade
system. Although households are not regulated, they will not be free from the
consequences of higher prices due to the new carbon-restricting regime. To
alleviate these economic effects, the government will offer assistance in the form
of “tax cuts, higher family payments and increases in pensions and allow-
ances.”92
Coal-fired electricity producers will also receive assistance under both carbon
tax and cap-and-trade systems. Currently, “coal-fired generation . . . accounts for
82. The symbol “A$” stands for Australian dollars.
83. Id., pt 4, div 2, s 100.
84. ROSS GARNAUT, THE GARNAUT REVIEW 2011: AUSTRALIA IN THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
72 (2011). The notion that the gap between Australian carbon prices and prices in countries with economy-wide
carbon-restrictions should be minimized is both intuitive (i.e., avoidance of major price fluctuations in the path
to a global carbon price) and foretelling, as it will become clear.
85. Id.
86. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., SECURING A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE: THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT’S
CLIMATE CHANGE PLAN 26 (Sydney: Commonwealth of Australia 2011), available at http://www.cleanenergy
future.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Consolidated-Final.pdf.
87. CEA pt 4, div 2, s 100.
88. See id., pt 2, s 17.
89. Id.
90. Id., pt 2, s 18.
91. See id., pt 4, div 1 s 93.
92. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., supra note 86, at 37.
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around 75% of Australia’s electricity.”93 Coal-fired plants release more GHGs
than generators using other energy sources, such as natural gas.94 To provide for a
smooth transition into the carbon-restricting regime, the government will negoti-
ate the closure of some plants and provide assistance through free allowances and
loans to plants that demonstrate plans to invest in lowering emissions.95 The
government will cover 23% of these facilities’ total carbon unit liability until
June 30, 2017.96
C. ADDRESSING CARBON LEAKAGE
To prevent carbon leakage, the CEA establishes the Jobs and Competitiveness
Program (“JCP”).97 The JCP “provides assistance to the most emissions-in-
tensive activities in the economy that are highly exposed to international
competition—either on export markets or from importers.”98 According to the
Australian Government, “almost all emissions-intensive and trade-exposed activi-
ties are in the manufacturing sector.”99 For this reason, “[t]he [JCP] will provide
assistance to activities that generate over 80% of emissions within the manufac-
turing sector.”100 The government expects forty to fifty activities to be eligible.
Sectors affected range from aluminum, steel, paper, glass, and cement manufac-
turers to oil refineries.101
Like the E.U. ETS, the government will distribute free carbon permits to
protect the activities that are at-risk of carbon leakage.102 To qualify as an
Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed activity due to a high risk for carbon leak-
age, an activity must pass both a preliminary and formal assessment.103 Under the
preliminary assessment, trade exposure is determined through quantitative and
qualitative measures.104 The quantitative threshold requires a ratio of value of
imports and exports (i.e., total trade) to value of domestic production greater than
10% in any one year from 2004 to 2008.105 The qualitative test looks at a
producer’s inability to pass through costs (measured on a per-activity basis) due
93. Id. at 71.
94. See id. at 72.
95. Id. at 74-75.
96. See id. at 75.
97. See id. at 53 (“Carbon leakage is not in Australia’s interests—either from an environmental or an
economic point of view. The Jobs and Competitiveness Program is designed to reduce this risk.”).
98. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., supra note 86, at 54.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See CEA pt 7, div 1, s 144.
103. See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., supra note 86, at 54-55; AUSTL. GOVT: DEP’T CLIMATE CHANGE &
ENERGY EFFICIENCY, GUIDANCE PAPER: ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE JOBS AND
COMPETITIVENESS PROGRAM 7 (Canberra: Department of Climate Change and Efficiency 2011).
104. See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., supra note 86, at 115.
105. Id.
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to the potential for international competition.106 Still at the preliminary assess-
ment stage, the government will also look at an activity’s emissions intensity,
calculated as the ratio of “emissions per million dollars of revenue or emissions
per million dollars of [value] added.”107
Should the preliminary assessment indicate that the activity has the potential
for inclusion in the JCP, the analysis proceeds to a three-step formal assess-
ment.108 In the first step, the government drafts a definition that delineates the
boundaries of the activity.109 In the second step, the government collects emis-
sions, trade, and financial data from the entity (again, on a per-activity basis).110
Finally, the government makes its final determination using the collected data.111
If the activity passes both the preliminary and formal assessments, the entity
will be entitled to assistance under the JCP. The JCP divides eligible activities
into two categories according to their exposure to carbon leakage based on
the information collected during the preliminary and formal assessments. The
higher-risk category, which includes “[t]he most emissions-intensive and trade-
exposed activities,” will receive “94.5% shielding from the carbon price”112 (i.e.,
94.5% of emissions will be covered by free allowances). On the other hand, 66%
of the emissions from lower-risk activities will be covered by free allowances.113
To provide both categories with incentives for further emissions reductions, the
government will reduce assistance rates by 1.3% per year.114
D. GOING FORWARD: SURVIVABILITY MECHANISM DESIGN AND CONVERGENCE
WITH THE E.U. REGIME
Like the E.U. regime, the Australian emissions legislation has not yet in-
troduced a BCA, although legislators recently added “a matching charge of A$23
per metric ton (in carbon-equivalent terms)”115 to a preexisting tariff charged on
imports of synthetic carbon-based refrigerants (i.e., GHGs that are also ozone
depleting).116 Remarkably, the lack of a domestic industry that produces these
GHG gases largely explains Australia’s willingness to resort to a BCA: Where
106. See id.
107. Id. The emissions data will come from the years 2006-08 and the revenue or value added data will come
from 2004 through the first half of 2008-09. Id.
108. See AUSTL. GOV’T: DEP’T CLIMATE CHANGE & ENERGY EFFICIENCY, supra note 103, at 7.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., supra note 86, at 55.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Murray Griffin, Australia’s Carbon Price Scheme Starts Up; Large Emitters to Pay $23.50 Per Metric
Ton, BLOOMBERG BNA WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REP., July 2, 2012, available at http://news.bna.com/clln/
CLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid27244009&vnameccrnotallissues&jda0d3j8y9u6&split0.
116. See Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas (Import Levy) Amendment Regulation 2012
(No. 1) (Cth) sch 1, reg 5.
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there is no domestic industry producing a particular class of heat-forcing gases,
internal taxes and cap-and-trade measures (normally applicable only to domestic
activities) are no longer relevant policy tools. Under these circumstances, the
imposition of a tariff is the only mechanism that can ensure the true cost of a
given group of GHGs is reflected on market prices of downstream activities.
Arguably, the E.U. also resorted to a somewhat similar externally focused
approach in one particular setting, where domestic standards could not apply
because domestic suppliers, operating under E.U. laws, simply could not supply
the relevant good. Similar to the Australian example above is the inclusion of
all incoming flights into the E.U. in the EU’s cap-and-trade system (see Part I.E).
By including the entire incoming portion of such flights in the ETS, the E.U. can
ensure that the GHG impact of the input (e.g., jet fuel) not supplied by an industry
operating under E.U. regulations (i.e., foreign-based suppliers to incoming
flights) is fully captured in the downstream activity’s overall GHG emissions.
This willingness to cover extraterritorial activity, through the imposition of a
BCA or inclusion in a cap-and-trade scheme, reveals that carbon-restricting
regimes can be adjusted to affect industrial sectors that would otherwise be less
exposed to (or even completely bypass) the regular effects of inward-directed
carbon pricing.
More recent events indicate the Australian carbon-restricting regime might
face some serious political challenges in the near future. Liberal (i.e., conserva-
tive) opposition to carbon pricing has strengthened and its leader has vowed to
repeal the scheme should they return to power after the next election, which
might happen by the end of 2013.117 However, experts suggest that repeal, though
a possibility and an easy campaign promise, would be laborious, due to obstruc-
tion under parliamentary rules, and would require addressing serious budgetary
considerations, such as the revenue shortfall that would result from the loss of
emission permit revenue.118 Currently, emission permits are valued around A$9
billion per year, with close to A$5 billion per year going back to households as
tax cuts and other energy offset assistance.119 While a blanket repeal would avoid
these budgetary implications, it would not be a panacea. Climate inaction “would
not end the debate over climate change policy.”120 Should the liberal government
attempt to address climate change following a repeal, foregoing carbon pricing
while imposing a non-market based regulatory approach would not necessarily
cost Australians any less. As Professor Garnaut warned, inaction (or repeal) may
merely “end the possibility of action at a relatively low cost.”121 Moreover, the
alternative, outright abandonment of Australia’s emission reduction commit-
117. See Frank Jotzko, Australia’s Carbon Price, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 475, 476 ( 2012).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. GARNAUT, supra note 84, at xvii.
121. Id.
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ments, may not be as appealing to a liberal government at a time when its major
trading partners are moving in the other direction.
In the meantime, the current labor/green governing coalition is not a mere
spectator. Between now and late 2013, the government, keen on ensuring the
preservation of one of its proudest achievements, is likely to increase the costs of
abandoning the current carbon restrictions. While the CEA’s mechanism design
features122 can be abrogated by a new parliamentary majority, even a quick repeal
will not immediately affect CCA’s current work and the initiatives already set in
motion to ensure compliance with emission targets.123 Tellingly, the recently
announced linking of the Australian scheme with the E.U. ETS system will
make repeal much more costly than before by adding commitments with a major
trading party.124 Under this linking scheme, Australian businesses currently
subject to the carbon tax can immediately buy E.U. emission allowances, hold
on to them, and eventually use them when Australia switches to cap and trade
on July 1, 2015.125 The linking of the two carbon-restricting regimes will
be complete on that date, when E.U. parties will be able to buy Australian
allowances, thus effectively equalizing Australian and E.U. carbon prices.126
This will certainly have a long-term stabilizing effect on carbon prices, thus
reducing uncertainty for industries currently covered by carbon-restricting regu-
lations.
The E.U. and Australian carbon-restricting regimes, though originally set up
differently (one, a carbon tax with a fixed price for carbon, the other, a cap-
and-trade system with a floating market price for allowances), are set to converge
into cap and trade, with linked emission trading systems that will provide another
boost to the creation of a global robust market price for carbon. As they evolve,
both systems are likely to keep focusing on major emission sources while
providing assistance to trade-sensitive, carbon-leakage-prone sectors at declining
rates over time, under a logic that pairs government subsidies to incentives for
continued carbon efficiency. As carbon prices converge and stabilize, industries
in carbon-restricting nations will be under constant pressure to improve carbon
efficiency to satisfy regulatory and competitive needs. Competitors in carbon-
friendly nations will not overlook the emergence of newer carbon-efficient
122. See generally CEA pt 22 (creating the Climate Change Authority (“CCA”) and establishing that
members of the CCA, who serve five-year, fixed terms, are to establish long-term emission-reduction targets,
which must be considered by the Climate Change Minister, tabled in parliament and specifically addressed by
the government).
123. See Roger J. Keenan et al., Science and the Governance of Australia’s Climate Regime, 2 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 477, 478 ( 2012).
124. See Murray Griffin & Stephen Gardner, EU, Australia to Link Carbon Schemes with First Phase
Starting in 2015, BLOOMBERG BNA WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REP., Aug. 28, 2012, available at http://news.
bna.com/ieln/IELNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid27703916&vnameinernotallissues&jda0d4g7w9w3&
split0.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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production and the technological breakthroughs that will accompany this transfor-
mation. The terms of this new competition and the effects it will have in other
countries will prove critical to furthering the development of a binding legal
framework for multilateral action on climate change.
III. CROSS-BORDER REPERCUSSIONS FROM THE E.U. AND AUSTRALIAN
CARBON-RESTRICTING REGIMES
A. PRODUCTION DECISIONS IN A CARBON-FRIENDLY WORLD
To understand the competitive pressures that carbon-restricting policies in
some countries exert on producers in carbon-friendly nations, one needs to come
to grips with how these different production regimes affect the way technological
innovations are introduced. The discussion of these two competing production
regimes focuses initially on microeconomic analyses, taking the theory of the
firm as the locus of decisions regarding the adoption of alternative technol-
ogies. I then use some microeconomic insights to explore causal linkages
between changes in the regulatory environment and producers’ responses to such
changes in light of their competitive concerns. These linkages are fundamental to
triggering the chain of pro-climate action events explained in this article.
One can gain some valuable insight on firms’ decision-making processes
regarding the use of different technologies in terms of carbon intensity by first
looking at how firms make such decisions in a carbon-friendly world: a world
where the true cost of carbon emissions is not reflected in market prices. At this
initial stage, firm managers often face decisions regarding the economic feasibil-
ity of using the existing technology—which involves known costs—compared to
the long-run gains involved in the implementation of some new technology that
will likely have higher short-term costs. When faced with decisions of this
kind, managers usually resort to a specific type of microeconomic analysis: the
theory of the firm. The central assumption under this theory is that firms choose
the bundle of factors of production (e.g., combinations of different inputs and
technologies) that minimizes the cost of producing a given level of output.127
However, to illustrate the different choices available to producers in a carbon-
friendly world, a couple of additional assumptions are necessary. Assume that,
to compete in a particular product market, a manager faces two alternatives:
(i) using a new, carbon-efficient technology that has higher average costs; or
(ii) using a lower-average-cost, carbon-intensive technology currently available
in the market.128 In figure 1, HH depicts the cost structure that can potentially be
127. See VARIAN, supra note 2, at 339.
128. Average cost curves are U-shaped because they are the combination of two curves: (i) the average fixed
cost curve, which slopes downward because fixed costs decrease as output increases; and (ii) the average
variable cost curve, which slopes upward because variable costs eventually increase as output increases.
Id. at 350.
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generated by the high average cost (“HAC”) strategy if the firm invests and
effectively deploys the new carbon-efficient technology. These investments
significantly raise fixed costs in the lower range of output, that is illustrated by the
leftward/upward tilt in HH. In contrast, LL depicts the cost structure the firm
faces if it decides to compete on the basis of a low average cost (“LAC”) strategy
associated with one of the existing carbon-intensive technologies. As such, LL
requires little or no new investment, which means lower fixed costs across the
lower range of output, resulting in the more classic parabolic shape.
Assuming both LL and HH curves in figure 1 are known cost structures, it will
make sense for firms in this environment to choose the HAC strategy that
generates HH only if each could supply a market demand as great as qc. Where
industry demand is simply not large enough to enable an HAC firm to supply
output at least equal to qc, LL will displace HH as the best cost structure, hence
the carbon-efficient technology will not be adopted.
However, the introduction of carbon-restricting policies, in particular, the
emergence of a market-based price for carbon, pushes firms in such countries not
only to look for small improvements in production under existing LAC technolo-
gies, but also to consider alternative HAC technologies, which become increas-
L L 
H 
H
qc 
cc 
Output 
(q) 
Unit Cost 
(c) 
FIGURE 1. Cost Strategies and Competition Among Firms Operating in a Carbon-
Friendly World
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ingly competitive. This change happens at both the intra-firm and inter-firm level
and makes HAC technologies more appealing for the reasons discussed below.
B. COST MINIMIZATION AND PRODUCTION DECISIONS UNDER A
CARBON-RESTRICTING REGIME
To illustrate the effects of carbon-restricting legislation at the intra-firm level,
one first makes the standard assumption that a firm chooses among factors of
production so as to minimize the cost of producing a given optimal level of
output. It follows that a firm’s factor allocation changes in response to changes in
its factor prices. Suppose that a firm faces two sets of prices (w1t ), w2t) and
w1s , w2s) that are associated with production choices x1t , x2t ), and x1s , x2s), where t
and s stand for choices at different times. Suppose, further, that different
combinations of these factors of production produce the same level of output,
y.129 Because each allocation is, by assumption, a cost-minimizing choice to
produce y, it follows that the firm’s choices satisfy the following inequalities:
w1
t x1
t  w2
t x2
t  w1
t x1
s  w2
t x2
x
, (A)
and
w1
sx1
s  w2
sx2
s  w1
sx1
t  w2
sx2
t
. (B)
After making some substitutions and rearranging B,130 one obtains:
(w1t  w1s)(x1t  x1s)  (w2t  w2s)(x2t  x2s)  0,
which, rewritten in “delta notation” to depict more succinctly changes in the
firm’s factor demands and prices, becomes:
w1x1  w2x2  0.
This last inequality shows that an increase in the price of factor 1 (i.e.,
w1  0)—say, due to the emergence of carbon pricing and to factor 1’s carbon
intensity—accompanied by no change in factor 2’s price (i.e., w2  0)—say,
due to the latter’s negligible carbon intensity—changes this inequality to:
w1x1  0.
This change will force the firm to decrease its demand for factor 1, if it is to keep
129. This section borrows heavily from Professor Varian’s discussion of revealed cost minimization. See id.
130. For a more detailed description of the steps involved see id.
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its output constant (i.e., at y) while adhering to cost minimization. The upshot
of the transition to a carbon-restricting regime and thus the pricing of carbon
emissions as a factor of production is a reordering of the firms’ priorities
regarding resource use and input selection. Of course, this may push the firm to
look for less carbon-intensive substitutes for factor 1, that may be nominally
more costly. However, the firm’s profitability may remain at the same level,
despite higher costs, if it receives some kind of government assistance (e.g., tax
rebates, green subsidies, etc.).
In terms of figure 1, the net effect of the transition to a carbon-restricting
regime at the inter-firm level will be an upward shift in the LL curve due to
increased prices for more carbon-intensive inputs, a result of the shift to a
carbon-restricting regime. This will make strategies that generate HH curves
more competitive for firms that can supply a market demand at any quantity
within in the qc-qc range, as illustrated in figure 2:
In fact, where market demand is exactly qc, any attempt to keep production along
the LL curve (i.e., the more carbon-intensive technology) will be ill-advised. As
more firms make the transition to production under technologies that generate
HH, scale economies and learning effects are likely to shift HH inward, further
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FIGURE 2. Cost Strategies and Competition Among Firms Operating in a Carbon-
Restricting Regulatory Environment
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displacing LL-like curves as lower cost alternatives for quantities below qc
should market demand fall to such levels.131 Moreover, as carbon prices rise over
time due to the expiration of free allowances and elimination of initial green
subsidies, LL-like curves will shift upwards, further eroding the market for firms
that continue using more carbon intensive technologies. These changes demon-
strate how the shift to carbon pricing affects firm choice at both the individual and
collective level in carbon-restricting countries in the short-run (i.e., where firms
contemplate fixed costs).132 These changes will also influence firm decisions
in the long run, where sticking with sunk, higher costs associated with older
technologies will make even less sense.133 More importantly, this shift in the
energy intensity of production will not go unnoticed by firms abroad.
C. HOW COMPETITIVENESS CONCERNS & REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY AFFECT
TRADE-EXPOSED FIRMS IN CARBON-FRIENDLY NATIONS
Exporting firms in carbon-friendly nations, though initially not affected by
restrictions on carbon emissions ought to concerned by these developments.
Although only producers in carbon-restricting countries face these costly regula-
tions, their burden of switching to less carbon-intensive production is somewhat
assuaged by a combination of different government policies designed to mitigate
initial transition costs and avoid carbon leakage (see Parts I and II). As E.U. and
Australian competitors receive different forms of government assistance (e.g.,
free allowances, tax rebates, green subsidies) and are otherwise eased into these
new regulations, they develop more carbon-efficient production methods, that
may lead to the emergence of technological gaps and a resulting competitive
advantage in certain industries.
131. See STERN, supra note 8, at 397.
132. The economic distinction between the short run and the long run rests on the notion that the long run is,
by definition, the period when “all the factors of production can be varied.” VARIAN, supra note 2, at 313. In
other words, there are no fixed costs in the long run.
133. Behavior economists and psychologists argue that loss aversion—manifested in the fear of economic
losses due to the abandonment of prior equipment or technology—causes actors to insist on an endeavor once
an investment is made due to the operation of the endowment effect and other mental quirks that lead to devia-
tions from rational thinking. See, e.g., Hai R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Costs,
35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES, 124, 132 (1984) (demonstrating, through ques-
tionnaires, “the sunk cost effect” and how the desire not to “appear wasteful” inflates individuals’ estimates of
the success of their “prior spending” decisions). Thus, Behavior Economics (prospect theory, to be precise)
challenges the traditional microeconomic argument that rational economic actors do not take prices paid (i.e.,
sunk costs) as benchmarks for future investments because, as explained (see note 127), in the long run, all costs
are variable. To traditional microeconomists, focusing on incurred costs, when all options are open, amounts to
throwing good money after bad, which is irrational. This difference between the two theories need not trouble us
here. In an environment of aggravating climate change and growing pressure for carbon-restricting measures
that turn carbon into a factor of production, it is unlikely that firms would retain costs associated with formerly
cheaper, yet increasingly costly carbon-inefficient technologies due to the sunk cost effect. In other words, if
firms are already minimizing expenditures on a factor of production due its increasing cost in the short run, they
are likely to continue doing so in the long run.
2013] IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON-RESTRICTING REGIMES 437
The notion that environmental regulations can spur innovation that may offset
compliance costs is not a novel concept. Several studies have credited the im-
position of environmental measures with leading companies to achieve both
product and process offsets.134 A changing technological environment will also
give rise to the development of new industry standards where achievements in
lower carbon intensity will gain increasing notoriety and even influence technol-
ogy choices by firms operating under other, less stringent regulatory regimes.
Using an empirical approach (i.e., a computational general equilibrium model)
that also endogenizes technological innovation, Di Maria and van der Werf show
that technical innovations in emissions-constraining nations can influence pro-
duction decisions in unconstrained nations and may reduce or even eliminate
carbon leakage.135 They explain that carbon leakage between two highly devel-
oped countries may be reduced depending on the extent to which the supply of
carbon-based energy is sensitive to price declines arising from the reduction in
consumption of such energy in the restricting country. Specifically, they demon-
strate that if small decreases in fossil fuel prices can trigger sizeable reductions
in fossil fuel production (i.e., fossil fuel production is price-elastic), then, as
energy-saving technological effects take place, fossil fuels will become increas-
ingly costly to produce (and even trade, if transportation costs are high), thus
inducing carbon-efficiency in non-restricting developed nations.136 A more
recent computational general equilibrium model that looks at carbon leakage
between Annex B and non-Annex B countries (i.e., developed vs. less developed
countries, broadly speaking) bears these findings by demonstrating that leakage
rates, though higher between these two sets of countries, decline as the price
elasticity of supply of fossil fuels increases.137
Yet the mere possibility of carbon leakage (whatever the actual price elasticity
of supply might be) and the expected phasing out of initial forms of assistance
and flexible rules in the E.U. and Australia will create pressures for greater
regulatory scrutiny of foreign-sourced, carbon-friendly goods and services. In
fact, the E.U. Commission already has the authority and may choose to impose a
134. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Towards a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSPS. 97, 102-103 (1995) (citing several studies and providing
examples of how innovation offsets have reduced or eliminated the cost of compliance with environmental
regulations).
135. See Corrado Di Maria & Edwin van der Werf, Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Change Policy
with Directed Technical Change, 39 ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON. 55, 57, 69-70 (2008).
136. See id. at 70.
137. See Joshua Elliott et al., Unilateral Carbon Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments and Carbon Leakage 31
fig. 10 (Univ. of Chicago and Nat’l Argonne Lab., Working Paper No. 12-04, 2012). A US government study has
also shown that relocation costs and various characteristics of certain carbon-intensive sectors may dampen the
potential for carbon leakage. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE EFFECTS OF H.R. 2454 ON INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS AND EMISSION LEAKAGE IN ENERGY-INTENSIVE TRADE-EXPOSED INDUSTRIES: AN INTERAGENCY
REPORT RESPONDING TO A REQUEST FROM SENATORS BAYH, SPECTER, STABENOW, MCCASKILL, AND BROWN 21-23
(2009).
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carbon equalization system anytime.138 It issued a formal decision listing nu-
merous E.U. sectors and subsectors “deemed to be exposed to a significant risk
of carbon leakage” as candidates for free allocations or competitive assistance
via carbon equalization under the terms of the Amending and Founding Direc-
tives.139 Although to date, the E.U. Commission has not turned to BCAs, and
exporters to the E.U. are taking notice.140
The resulting regulatory uncertainty gradually pushes exporters and cer-
tain producers in carbon-friendly nations to voluntarily engage in the pursuit of
carbon-restricting strategies. This occurs because exporters and producers gen-
erally abhor regulatory disuniformity and the significant costs it imposes.
Exporters, multinational corporations, and businesses who operate in vertically
integrated industries closely monitor regulatory developments in several jurisdic-
tions, focusing on how new and likely forthcoming regulations may affect entire
production chains that may be located in different jurisdictions with distinct
regulations. From the perspective of exporters and highly integrated industries,
regulatory convergence may reduce overall compliance costs and simplify
operational choices and planning even at the cost of accepting newer regulations.
For instance, although initially opposed by industry, the international regime for
ozone-depleting gases was eventually supported by industry favoring the predict-
ability of regulatory convergence over the regulatory fragmentation that would
result if different countries pursued varied abatement approaches to ozone
depletion.141 Arguably, the same phenomenon is likely to occur as producers take
note of different nations’ evolving climate change mitigating efforts. Moreover,
the desire of producers of tradable products to remain competitive in foreign
markets and avoid the development of technological gaps in carbon efficiency
provides an added incentive to internalize aspects of foreign carbon-restricting
regimes even before formal regulatory convergence takes place.142
138. See Amending Directive, pmbl. ¶ 25, 2009 O.J. (L140) 66-67 (stating that “[e]nergy-intensive
industries which are determined to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage could receive a higher
amount of free allocation or an effective carbon equalisation system could be introduced with a view to putting
installations from the Community which are at significant risk of carbon leakage and those from third countries
on a comparable footing.”).
139. See Commission Decision of 24 December 2009 [hereinafter “December 2009 E.U. List”], art. 1 &
annex, 2009 O.J. (L1) 10, 13-18 (EC).
140. See, e.g., Katsuri Das, How Vulnerable is India’s Trade to Possible Border Carbon Adjustments in the
EU?, 46(2) J. WORLD TRADE 249, 274 (2012) (demonstrating that at least 82% of India’s exports to the E.U.
could “eventually come under the purview of any future [BCA],” based on a study that matches the sectors and
subsectors identified in the December 2009 E.U. List with the tariff classifications of India’s current exports to
the EU).
141. Kristen Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local
Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does this Say about Federalism and Environmental Law,
38 URB. L. 1015, 1027 (2006).
142. For an empirical, U.S.-focused discussion of how carbon mitigation failed in the U.S. Congress in the
past and how foreign subglobal carbon-restricting efforts might tip industry support in the other direction in the
future, see Juscelino F. Colares, Paths to Carbon Stabilization: How Foreign Carbon-Restricting Reforms Will
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The emergence of business interest in carbon-efficient production, though
originally reactive, will gradually evolve into the active pursuit of climate-
friendly legislative and regulatory action. In this effort, carbon-efficient produc-
ers will join forces with environmental groups.143 A separate set of concerns with
transition costs, carbon leakage and maintaining competitiveness with respect
to domestic nonexporting producers will motivate innovating exporters to en-
gage in efforts that ensure the cost of investing in newer, less carbon-intensive
technologies is also borne by their domestic, nonexporting counterparts.144
Because carbon leakage does not stop at the border, these leading carbon-efficient
producers will also want to bring their competitors from carbon-laggard nations
under similar rules.145 These parallel cost neutrality considerations will lead
industry stakeholders to take an increasing interest in the enactment of national
carbon-restricting regimes.
D. GROWING MOMENTUM TOWARD A BINDING MULTILATERAL
CARBON-RESTRICTING AGREEMENT
Although the enactment of legislation will substantially reduce regulatory and
competitive uncertainty in home markets, a growing number of carbon-efficient
national industries will vie for international disciplines that harmonize the
different proliferating carbon-restricting regimes and their level-the-playing-field
measures. In fact, this trend toward adopting carbon-restriction reforms reaches
beyond the E.U. and Australia (although these nations have the most com-
prehensive systems) and is intensifying (e.g., Brazil,146 China,147 Mexico,148
Affect U.S. Industry, Climate Policy and the Prospects of a Binding Emission Reduction Treaty, 47.3 J. WORLD
TRADE 281 (forthcoming 2013).
143. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 64 (1992)
(explaining how, in the U.S. context, “[o]n occasion, environmental groups and industry also may form a
coalition, to obtain legislation that for varying reasons is beneficial to both.”). Farber’s intuition that industry
“does not seem to provide the primary impetus for environmental legislation” is confirmed in this context by the
realization that industry engagement here will be a second-best, strategic alternative derived from a desire to
reduce regulatory uncertainty and address competitive challenges. See id.
144. See id. (noting that “large textile or chemical firms may support environmental standards that
discriminate against their smaller [domestic] competitors”).
145. See id. (noting that “domestic car producers may support safety standards that discriminate against
foreign producers”).
146. See Michael Kepp, Brazilian City Sells $2M in Emissions Reduction Credits, [2012] ENERGY AND
CLIMATE REP. (BNA) No. 113, (Jun. 16, 2012), available at http://news.bna.com/clln/CLLNWB/split_
display.adp?fedfid27055009&vnameccrnotallissues&fcn5&wsn500538000&fn27055009&split0
(describing how Sa˜o Paulo sold €1.749 million worth of GHG emissions credits).
147. See Michael Standaert, Policies for Pilot Carbon Trading Projects in China Nearly Completed, but
Delays Still Likely, [2012] ENERGY AND CLIMATE REP. (BNA) NO. 98, (May 21, 2012), available at http://
news.bna.com/clln/CLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid26218485&vnameccrnotallissues&fcn3&wsn
501016000&fn26218485&split0 (noting that about 2,000 businesses have decided to join China’s pilot
trading schemes which should start launching in 2013 and that the Chinese national trading scheme most likely
will launch in 2016).
148. See Michael Kepp, Environment Minister Says Mexico Aims Higher Than Proposed Rio20 Agree-
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New Zealand,149 South Africa,150 South Korea,151 Turkey152). The same can
be said about the need for a multilateral GHG emissions reduction agreement,
which Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
recently committed to finalize by 2015.153 Delay in finalizing these negotiations
will create incentives for carbon-restricting countries to adopt dreaded, disruptive
unilateral action to combat freeriding.
IV. TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON-RESTRICTING POLICIES
A. EARLY STAGE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE USE OF TRADE LITIGATION
So far, Australia and the E.U. have been somewhat surprisingly hesitant to use
BCAs. Arguably, these regimes have not deployed a general BCA largely due to
their greater willingness to use broad government assistance programs as an
offsetting strategy to carbon restrictions,154 unlike the United States where there
is more ideological opposition to near economywide or even industry-specific
subsidization (except in the case of the politically powerful defense, financial
ment, [2012] ENERGY AND CLIMATE REP. (BNA) NO. 120, (June 21, 2012), available at http://news.bna.com/
clln/display/no_alpha.adp?modesi&frag_id27135790&itemcountry%3amx&prodclln&catcountry (dis-
cussing a law signed on June 5, 2012 that “obligates Mexico to meet its international commitments to cut GHG
emissions . . . [and] also authorizes the government to establish a voluntary emissions cap-and-trade scheme for
emissions”).
149. See Eduard Goldberg, New Zealand Plans to Soften Economic Impact of Emissions Trading System,
35 INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) NO. 15, (Jul. 6, 2012), available at http://news.bna.com/ieln/display/no_
alpha.adp?modesi&frag_id27273112&itemcountry%3anz&prodieln&catcountry (discussing pos-
sible ways to prolong transition measures for New Zealand’s own ETS).
150. See Paul Stinson, South Africa’s Cabinet Endorses Road Map for Deploying Carbon Capture and
Storage, [2012] ENERGY AND CLIMATE REP. (BNA) NO. 91, (May 10, 2012), available at http://news.bna.com/
clln/CLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid26040167&vnameccrnotallissues&fcn4&wsn501276000&fn
26040167&split0 (reporting that South Africa’s cabinet “has approved a carbon capture and storage plan as
one avenue for reducing the country’s GHG emissions” and the Finance Minister is seeking public comment
regarding a possible carbon tax).
151. See James Lim, South Korea to Require Disclosure of Environmental Performance as of September,
[2012] ENERGYAND CLIMATE REP. (BNA) No. 130, (Jul. 6, 2012), available at http://news.bna.com/clln/CLLNWB/
split_display.adp?fedfid27272742&vnameccrnotallissues&fcn4&wsn500014000&fn27272742&
split0 (discussing how 490 companies that are responsible for more than 125,000 metric tons of carbon
dioxide annually have joined a disclosure program along with a “cap-without-trade” GHG program which will
start in January 2015).
152. See Rick Mitchell, Turkey Should Boost Fuel Taxation’s Role in Climate Change Policy, OED Says,
[2012] ENERGY AND CLIMATE REP. (BNA) No. 134, (Jul. 12, 2012), available at http://news.bna.com/clln/
CLLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid27307359&vnameccrnotallissues&jda0d3m9r1b3&split0 (noting
that Turkey “has one of the world’s most active carbon voluntary carbon markets” although it is “exempt from
setting quantitative emission targets under the [Kyoto] treaty”).
153. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11
December 2011, Dec. 1/CP.17, pmbl. & ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, at 2 (Mar. 15, 2012).
154. See, e.g., Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau & Julia Reinaud, The Interface Between the Trade and
Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues 26 (World Trade Org., Working Paper No. ERSD-2011-1, 2011)
(explaining how “governments may also choose to encourage GHG mitigation through subsidies.”).
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services, and agriculture lobbies).155 In contrast, a climate-friendly, bottom-up
lobbying effort on the part of trade-exposed U.S. industries would feature BCAs
as a preeminent offsetting tool. With lower prospects of securing government
assistance, their best chance of competing under carbon-restricting conditions
might be the combination of a defensive, sectorally-targeted BCA and an ag-
gressive lobbying campaign to push the United States toward challenging
forbidden and industry-specific green subsidies before the WTO. That the
United States has already started challenging green subsidies abroad even before
committing to domestic, economy-wide carbon-restricting reforms is a good
indication of how litigious it might become when it finally moves in that
direction. Despite vowing support for “the rapid deployment of solar energy
around the world,” the United States has recently requested consultations with
India (the first official step in bringing a dispute before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body) due to the domestic content requirements prescribed under
India’s national solar program, the “Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission.”156
Thus, political differences aside, trade policy will have a critical role in the
emerging carbon-restricting economy. Indeed, it is proving its importance even
now, where the E.U./Australian choice of not adopting a BCA may well arise
from a desire to avoid retaliatory challenges against the broad assistance pro-
grams designed to mitigate the effects of their carbon-restricting regulations. This
strategy also has an offensive dimension. Currently, the E.U. is challenging
(with Japan) a Canadian province’s green energy program that requires electric
grid utilities “to purchase electricity from [local] renewable sources.”157 This
program, however, conditions access to such guaranteed supply contracts to solar
and wind producers’ usage of “minimum amounts of goods and services that
originate in [the Province of] Ontario.”158 Because this dispute targets “subsidies
contingent . . . upon the use of domestic over imported goods,”159 that as prohib-
ited subsidies, are de lege specific160 and thus easy-to-prosecute, the risk
of exposing the E.U. cap-and-trade system to a retaliatory challenge on these
grounds is slight, as it currently does not incorporate such subsidies (see dis-
cussion in Part I).
However, the E.U. probably expects eventual challenges to more difficult to
155. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Challenges for Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States,
41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 10-11 (2004) (suggesting that free trade has been the dominant political ideology in the
US Congress for some time).
156. See USTR Press Release (Feb., 2013) (statement by United States Trade Representative, Ambassador
Ron Kirk), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/february/us-challenges-
india-restrictions-solar.
157. Daniel Pruzin, EU Joins Japanese Trade Challenge of Ontario Alternative Energy Program, [2011]
ENERGY AND CLIMATE REP. (BNA) NO. 157, (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://news.bna.com/clln/CLLNWB/
split_display.adp?fedfid21797443&vnameccrnotallissues&fcn2&wsn507096000&fn21797443&split0.
158. Id.
159. SCM Agreement, supra note 45, art. 3.1(b).
160. Id., art. 2.3.
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prove subsidies, such as to the “financial measures” it adopts in support of
emitters deemed at significant risk of carbon leakage.161 Should such a chal-
lenge arise, the E.U. is likely to defend its anti-carbon-leakage measures on
non-specificity grounds (i.e., probably claiming eligibility to such assistance is
automatic, open to various industries and based on firm, objective criteria
prescribed in current written regulations).162 The E.U. would also affirmatively
defend its measures by arguing they come within the scope of GATT’s
Article XX(b)163 and/or (g)164 exceptions, adding that they fully comply with the
requirements of Article XX’s chapeau.165 Of course, the success of such a
defense will greatly depend on the manner in which any such measure is
implemented and on other case-specific aspects. Implementation of these pro-
grams may also give rise to other grounds for challenge under the GATT and
other WTO agreements, which are beyond the scope of this article.166
Thus, the E.U. has, so far, successfully balanced implementing its carbon-
restricting programs and avoiding challenges to them while not shying away
from targeting other members’ overt industrial policies that favor the renewable
energy sector. In fact, the E.U. seems to have incorporated trade litigation as a
supplementary policy tool to assist E.U. industries that have a particular role to
play in the emissions reduction area: the biofuels and the solar panel industries.
Not only has the E.U. imposed anti-dumping duties (“AD”) and countervailing
(“CVD”) (i.e., anti-subsidization) duties against U.S. biodiesel imports into the
E.U., the E.U. Commission is currently conducting AD and CVD investigations
on U.S. bioethanol imports167 and Chinese solar panels.168 This suggests that the
E.U. will not hesitate to resort to trade law to further the interests of its several
161. See Amending Directive, art. 10a (6), 2009 O.J. (L140) 73. The same can be said about Australia’s JCP
(carbon leakage assistance program), which I discussed in Part II.C.
162. SCM Agreement, supra note 45, art. 2.1(b).
163. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(b) (covering measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health”).
164. See id. art. XX(g) (covering “measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”).
165. See id., art. XX (requiring that measures be not applied arbitrarily and neither discriminate unjustifiably
among members “where the same conditions prevail” nor constitute “a disguised restriction on international
trade”).
166. Any differential treatment (e.g., differential internal taxation) between domestic and foreign products
premised on different conditions of production (i.e., carbon-restricting vs. carbon-friendly) could be deemed to
violate the “like product” requirement under GATT Article III. However, these charges could be defended under
GATT Article XX as well as under other grounds See Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, To B(TA) or Not to
B(TA)? On the Legality and Desirability of Border Tax Adjustments from a Trade Perspective, 34 WORLD ECON.
1911, 1915-20 (2011).
167. Joe Kirwin, EU Launches Trade Remedy Investigation Into Subsidies for U.S. Bioethanol Imports,
[2011] INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) NO. 19, (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://news.bna.com/itln/ITLNWB/split_
display.adp?fedfid23697460&vnameitrnotallissues&fcn13&wsn494329000&fn23697460&split0.
168. Joe Kirwin, EU Launches Antidumping Probe Into Chinese Solar Panel Imports, [2011] INT’L ENV’T
REP. (BNA) NO. 198, (Sept. 9, 2012), available at http://news.bna.com/ieln/IELNWB/split_display.adp?
fedfid27793784&vnameinernotallissues&jda0d4k9h1b6&split0.
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trade-exposed industries operating in the renewables sector. This willingness to
resort to both WTO and domestically-based trade/administrative remedies, whether
in furtherance of pro-carbon-restriction goals or to ensure trade fairness, illus-
trates the important role trade law has played and will continue to play in climate
policy. Yet, this also demonstrates that trade law can often undercut policies
designed to boost the development of new pro-climate industries, where such
policies (e.g., subsidization, discrimination in favor of domestic producers, etc.)
conflict with trade’s liberalizing, neutral goals. In fact, this is true even among
carbon-friendly regimes that are currently taking measures against each other’s
renewable industries.169
B. KEEPING TRADE FROM UNRAVELING THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
The importance of trade policy coordination to any future binding multilateral
emissions treaty cannot be overstated: An emission-stabilizing world requires a
high level of multilateral coordination in the use of trade-impacting measures,
lest trade frictions derail national investment plans and, with them, emission
targets. The potential mismatch between trade disciplines and environmental
goals can be at least partially overcome if countries converge on a common
strategy: phasing out industry-specific green subsidies, reducing or eliminating
domestic content requirements, and transitioning to truly neutral BCAs.170 As
tariffs, BCAs are the most transparent and easily monitored border measures.171
They also have two other attractive qualities: (i) they can help level the playing
field for a growing number of industries operating under carbon-restricting
conditions; and (ii) because tariffs mean “the country where the consumption
takes place gets the revenue,” they create incentives for exporters to adopt
carbon-restrictions to reduce or eliminate the duty.172 In fact, as E.U. industries
become more carbon efficient and the E.U. phases out subsidies (whether
countervailable or not under WTO law), resorting to BCAs will be an increas-
ingly appealing option. The same can be said of Australia, especially after it
transitions from a carbon tax to a cap-and-trade system in 2015 and gradually
169. See, e.g., Rossella Brevetti, ITA Preliminarily Assigns CV Duties On Imports of Wind Towers From
China, [2012] INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA), (June 7, 2012), available at http://news.bna.com/itln/ITLNWB/split
_display.adp?fedfid26849421&vnameitrnotallissues&fcn34&wsn493255500&fn26849421&split0
(describing how the US Commerce Department made a preliminary assessment against China for “providing
countervailable subsidies to producers/exporters of utility-scale wind towers ranging from 13.74 percent to
26.00 percent” and that the Commerce Department made a preliminary finding that China was dumping
photovoltaic cells and solar panels).
170. See supra text accompanying note 6.
171. For these reasons, tariffs have long been “the preferred trade barrier” under the WTO/GATT system.
See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 423 (5th ed. 2008).
172. See Elliott et al., supra note 137, at 11. Of course, these distributional “effects can be offset through
transfer payments between the countries.” Id.
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phases out free allowances. Moreover, as more countries adopt carbon-restricting
regimes and are tempted by subsidization, BCAs may become more attractive
since they are more transparent and thus less prone to generate trade friction.
However, the spread of BCAs as the least opaque, trade-neutral, pro-climate
border measure is not a panacea. For GHG stabilization to occur, trade law must
evolve beyond the narrow, activist liberal teleology that has characterized WTO
jurisprudence since the creation of the Dispute Settlement Body.173 In fact, the
pro-environment preamble to the WTO Charter,174 despite leading to seemingly
environment-friendly dicta, inspired WTO adjudicators to produce one single
decision, on a substantive dispute, upholding environmental or health-protecting
restrictions.175 With the exception of Brazil–Retreaded Tires, the regulations
WTO adjudicators struck down in these cases were not opaque, industry-specific
subsidies or disguised protectionist regulations designed to favor national cham-
pions. Rather, WTO adjudicators, and in particular the Appellate Body, have
repeatedly rejected national regulations as trade restrictions that were not owed
deference due to a perceived failure by the challenged countries to first pursue
multilateral negotiations before adopting regulations unilaterally.176
173. See Juscelino F. Colares, The Limits of WTO Adjudication: Is Compliance the Problem?, 14.2 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 403 (2011); Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to Biased
Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 383, 392 (2009); Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of
International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L
BUS. 109, 153, 159 (2002).
174. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154, pmbl. (recognizing that trade relations should “allow[] for the optimal use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environ-
ment . . .”) [hereinafter “WTO Charter”].
175. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (Hormones), WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (holding a French embargo on asbestos
and asbestos-containing products was not inconsistent with the EC’s obligations under the WTO agreements
and that it came within the scope of Article XX(b)). But see Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (holding a US regulation violated
Article III without justification under Article XX) [hereinafter “United States–Gasoline”]; Appellate Body
Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12,
1998) (holding US ban on shrimp imports from countries not certified under US regulations violated Article XI
without justification under XX)[hereinafter “US–Shrimp”]; Appellate Body Report, European Communities–
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (holding EC
ban on beef from hormone treated cattle in violation of risk assessment rules under Article 3 of the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures); Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Measures Affecting
Imports of Retreaded Tires, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) (holding Brazil’s imposition of an import ban on
retreaded tires was within the scope of Article XX(b) but not justified under the chapeau) [hereinafter
“Brazil–Retreaded Tires”]. In one compliance dispute, however, the Appellate Body did uphold a US
environmental conservation measure (Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act). However, this occurred
because Malaysia, one of the Complainants in the original substantive case (i.e., US–Shrimp), challenged the
revised turtle-safe shrimp harvesting US certification program, after failing to respond to repeated US requests
to file for certification. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 123, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001)
[hereinafter “United States–Shrimp Compliance”].
176. See e.g., United States–Gasoline, supra note 175, at 28-29 (faulting the United States for failing to
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Thus, not only should the new, binding multilateral emissions reduction
agreement expressly endorse adoption of neutral BCAs and discourage opaque
subsidies and unjustifiably discriminatory measures, but members of the WTO,
meeting as the Ministerial Conference, should adopt a binding declaration, under
Article IX.2 of the WTO Charter, that would enshrine emissions stabilization as
one of the foremost goals informing the interpretation of WTO law.177 Of course,
the history of WTO adjudication on Article XX’s environmental and health
exceptions shows a definite trend of rejecting pro-environment national measures
when these collide with free trade. Yet, in none of those decisions were WTO
adjudicators operating under a declaration that expressly requires deference to
measures enacted pursuant to emissions stabilization schemes. Furthermore,
though not speaking for the DSB, the WTO Secretariat and UNEP have already
commented favorably on the compatibility of carbon-restricting border mea-
sures with current WTO rules.178 Arguably, the influence of the WTO/UNEP
white paper, the spread of national carbon-restricting programs, and the multi-
lateral effort to achieve an emissions reduction agreement may persuade the
Appellate Body to uphold trade-restricting, yet neutral carbon-restricting regula-
tions. Indeed, the WTO Charter’s current prefatory language, which the Appellate
Body openly professes to endorse each time it imputes to the chapeau of
Article XX a “preference for multilateral approaches,”179 would support such an
interpretation.
Either way, only the close interlinking of these two systems will help reduce
trade disputes and ensure the joint interjurisdictional effects of domestic carbon-
restricting measures lead to GHG stabilization. In fact, it is no accident that both
Waxman-Markey (as any future U.S. statute) and current E.U. law expressly
recognize the need for an international legal framework that manages the
explore cooperation with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil before rejecting individual baselines for
foreign refiners that resulted in discrimination that “was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable,” thus
constituting “unjustifiable discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade.”); United States–
Shrimp, supra note 175, ¶ 166 (declaring that the United States was obligated to engage in “serious,
across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or mulitateral agreements . . . before
enforcing the import prohibition.”) (emphasis added); United States–Shrimp Compliance, supra note 175, ¶ 122
(attributing to “the decided preference for multilateral approaches voiced by WTO members and others in the
international community in various international agreements for the protection and conservation of endangered
sea turtles . . .” as legitimizing their view that the United States “would be expected to make good faith efforts to
reach international agreements . . . .”).
177. A decision to adopt such a binding interpretation would require a “three-fourths majority of the [WTO]
Members.” WTO Charter, supra note 174, art. IX.2. This suggestion could be cumulated with negotiation and
adoption of other binding interpretations. One such interpretation could allow for the differential tariff treatment
of carbon-efficient and carbon-inefficient products that are currently treated as “like products” under GATT
Article III. Such express deviations from the traditional “like product” classifications would greatly contribute
to the climate regime while reducing future litigation under article III. Further discussion of this and other
potential reforms is outside the scope of this article.
178. See WTO-UNEP REPORT supra note 75.
179. See United States–Shrimp Compliance, supra note 175, ¶ 122.
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growing climate change and trade interface, that both view as necessary to the
success of their efforts.180 To ensure compliance with future emission commit-
ments, these regimes should also consider authorizing the imposition of trade
measures against members that refuse to meet future binding emission targets, a
solution that has been adopted by at least three other environmental agreements:
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (1973); The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(1987); and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989).
CONCLUSION
Whether these medium-term events will come to pass exactly as conjectured
here matters less than realizing that implementing carbon-restricting reform
poses both domestic and international coordination problems. The more difficult
problem at the moment is how domestic political-economic interests in carbon-
friendly nations will align to achieve such coordination. This article’s original
contribution lies in presenting, arguably, the first explanation of how these forces
will converge to support national adoption of carbon-restricting regimes and
participation in a binding global agreement that harmonizes these emerging
regimes. While trade-effect equalization through BCAs is not essential to steer
carbon-friendly nations toward adopting their own carbon restrictions, only the
combined eventual adoption of neutral BCAs in a multilateral treaty and the
increased receptivity of environmental measures under the WTO system would
ensure a path toward GHG stabilization.
180. Compare H.R. 2454 §§ 761-762 (finding that “[t]he purposes of this part are—(1) to promote a strong
global effort to significantly reduce [GHG] emissions, and, through this global effort, stabilize [GHG]
concentrations in the atmosphere . . .” which “can be most effectively addressed and achieved through
agreements negotiated between the United States and foreign countries.”) with Aviation Directive, pmbl. ¶ 5,
2009 O.J. (L8) 4 (“The European Council emphasized that the E.U. is committed to a global and comprehensive
agreement for reductions in [GHG] emissions beyond 2012, providing an effective, efficient and equitable
response on the scale required to face climate change challenges.”).
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